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Terrorism and the Philosophy of History: Liberalism, Realism, and the
Supreme Emergency Exemption
Those who utilize terror techniques in attacks against liberal states are not constrained by liberal ideas
about justice in war.1 Indeed, many terrorists are intent on attacking liberalism itself because they view it
as a rival "comprehensive doctrine."2 One wonders then, whether liberalism should be constrained by its
own principles in responding to such attacks. I will discuss this issue in relation to John Rawls’ ideas of
justice in war, as found in his recent The Law of Peoples. I will indicate that, although Rawls’ attempts
to articulate an idea of international law that is "political" in his sense (that is not tied to any particular
comprehensive doctrine and yet reasonable for adherents of a plurality of such comprehensive doctrines),
his idea is tied to a specific philosophy of history that is potentially incompatible with other philosophies
of history. This can be seen in his discussion of the "supreme emergency exemption," which is an idea
about the historical necessity of violating liberal principles of justice in war in order to defend liberal
values from some overwhelming threat. This is problematic for political liberalism because an
acknowledgement of supreme emergencies in history is only possible either from within a more
substantive form of liberalism or from the perspective of political realism. In either case, invocation of a
supreme emergency might then justify those who view liberalism as a rival comprehensive doctrine,
which must be destroyed by any means necessary. I will suggest that the very idea of a supreme
emergency exemption to rules of justice in war, even in the face of terrorism, runs counter to the spirit of
the more substantive form of liberalism found in Kant. Kantian liberalism has no need for a supreme
emergency exemption or, rather, it avoids this realist expedient by postulating an optimistic philosophy
of history. Rawls’ political liberalism, however, is, as Rawls admits, a hybrid that is both realistic and
utopian. The realist component of political liberalism thus might allow a Rawlsian to support strong
action against terrorists. However, the realist exemption to the principles of justice can only be invoked
from within a philosophical interpretation of progress in history. Such a philosophy of history is thus a
metaphysical supplement to the ideals of political liberalism, one that threatens to disrupt the possibility
of overlapping consensus. A Kantian, for example, who would accept the basic principles of the Law of
Peoples, would reject the supreme emergency exemption. After discussing this problem, I will conclude
by arguing that currently terrorism does not constitute a supreme emergency.
Political Philosophy and History
Political philosophy is an ambiguous enterprise.3 It is concerned with questions of principles about
justice and morality. But this concern is connected with the changing nature of historical actuality. The
connection between theory and practice in political philosophy is often made by way of a philosophy of
history. Christian thinking about political philosophy, for example, occurs within an eschatological view
of history in which our concrete actions are crises to be judged in terms of the end of time. The political
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philosophies of Machiavelli and Hobbes, the two most famous proponents of political realism, can be
understood in terms of a cynical view of history as the repetition of self-interested action on the part of
individuals. Kant’s political philosophy—his advocacy of liberal values—is understandable in terms of
his hopeful philosophy of history in which progress is being made toward the establishment of perpetual
peace. Hegel’s political philosophy—more conservative, perhaps, but still liberal—follows from his faith
that modernity represents the completion of the development of the idea of freedom. Rawls’ recent
discussion of international law can also be understood in terms of a certain view of history. For Rawls,
history contains discrete entities called "Peoples" who act as political agents in the development of a
"Society of Peoples" and who will agree to principles of peaceful coexistence under the "Law of
Peoples."
The idea of a philosophy of history is a notoriously slippery one, since it involves making
teleological judgments about the future based upon past events. Kant discussed the problem of such
teleological judgments in his third Critique in 1790, claiming that they were regulative ideals of
reason. He applied this idea to history and politics in 1793 in his Religion book and in 1795 in
Perpetual Peace. His interest in this venture in political philosophy and philosophy of history was
to consider whether it is justified to hope for progress. He indicates that historical progress points
toward the development of both liberal republican states and peace because liberal states do not go
to war with one another, a claim that Rawls develops in The Law of Peoples. Kant’s reflections in
Perpetual Peace occur within a context of speculation about nature’s plan for human endeavor. He
states that nature herself indicates a "purposive plan of producing concord among men, even against
their will and indeed by means of their very discord."4 Kant recognizes that although this idea is
"far-fetched in theory, it does possess dogmatic validity and has a very real foundation in
practice."5 The point is that hope for progress is not grounded in a mere description of the facts of
history. Rather, hope functions as an ideal, which ought to guide practice.
Like Kant, Rawls is hopeful that peace will prevail. This is what makes Rawls’ idea "realistically
utopian" as he describes it throughout The Law of Peoples. He shares Kant’s hope for progress in
history as a practical ideal. However, Rawls goes beyond Kantian liberalism by incorporating a less
sanguine and more realistic (in the Machiavellian and Hobbesian sense) view of progress in history.
This has important implications for the way in which a Rawlsian might deal with the problem of
terrorism.
One wonders whether the fact of terrorism undermines hope for the completion of the liberal
political project. The fact of terrorism seems to indicate certain limits to the idea that international
politics can become stable and peaceful based upon the Law of Peoples. Unless one adopts a
philosophy of history in which reasonableness (as Rawls defines it) prevails, it seems that strife and
instability will continue because those who are not invested in the society of liberal and decent
peoples will resist it. Those who are disenfranchised by the liberal system will struggle against it.
Those whose religion is antagonized by liberal values will rally against it. And perhaps most
insidiously, those who are disposed to anarchism and antinomianism (here I think of McVeigh and
Kaczynski) will be opposed to it.
Kant is willing to make utopian claims about the trajectory of history because his liberalism is tied
to a more comprehensive view of human nature and morality. For Kant, the bin Ladens and
Kaczynskis of the world are immoral and irrational. Kant’s hope is that political peace will result as
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we all make progress toward enlightened morality and rationality. It is unclear, however, how
Rawls can ground his realistic utopia in a philosophy of history that is not in some sense tied to a
comprehensive doctrine about morality and rationality. Hope for the triumph of the Law of Peoples
is not strictly a "politically" liberal idea because it must appeal to a philosophy of history in which
"reasonable" peaceful coexistence triumphs over unreasonable fundamentalist or anarchist
resistance. Thus Rawls’ liberalism remains genuinely utopian and must be evaluated from the point
of view of a more "comprehensive" metaphysics of human being.6 My point is not that Rawls is
wrong about his hope but, rather, that his hope is more "comprehensive" than he wants to admit. He
concludes, for example, with the following claim: "If a reasonably just Society of Peoples whose
members subordinate their power to reasonable aims is not possible, and human beings are largely
amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask, with Kant, whether it is
worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth."7 The idea of "worthwhile" here clearly points
beyond political liberalism toward a more comprehensive view, which claims that peace is good and
that human beings ought to strive for it.
Terrorism In the present section I will define terrorism and in the next section I will weave
connections between philosophy of history, justice and war, around the issue of terrorism. What is
terrorism? This question has not been sufficiently analyzed by the pundits and politicians who are
hyping the war on terrorism. However, this question is important for understanding the propriety of
means taken to respond to terrorism. The RAND Corporation recently issued a prescient report,
Countering the New Terrorism, focused on the issue of the definition of terrorism and a discussion
of the best means to respond to terrorism. This report begins by recognizing that terrorists are
known by the acts they commit. In other words, terrorists commit criminal acts including
kidnapping, hijacking, and murder. Thus, "an act of terrorism was first of all a crime in the classic
sense."8 Although such acts are politically motivated, they are still criminal. Even if we accept the
fact that the terrorist is at war with us, the terrorist’s acts are, according to standard definitions of
justice in war, war crimes. "Terrorist tactics, in most cases, violated the rules that governed armed
conflict—for example, the deliberate targeting of noncombatants or actions against hostages."9
Finally, it is important to remember that terrorism uses its activities (its crimes) as a means to the
further end of creating fear in the target population. Indeed, the identity of the immediate victims of
terrorism is usually irrelevant, and the pain and deaths caused by terrorism is merely a means for
creating social anxiety.
The way in which we define terrorism will influence the way in which we understand the ethical
limits to our response to terrorism.10 As the RAND report indicates, if we deal will terrorism as
merely a criminal matter, then law enforcement activities will be the only justified response. This
raises certain practical difficulties, however, insofar as terrorism is an international problem
involving international victims and perpetrators as well as targets involved in international activities
such as airliners and embassies. Domestic law enforcement is constrained by the political reality of
borders and treaties. On the other hand, if we define terrorism as an act of war, we run into other
ethical and political problems such as a lowered burden of proof in establishing the culpability of
the "enemy" and the ethical and political problems associated with a concern for justice in war. In
more concrete terms, if Osama bin Laden and the others thought to be responsible for the
September 11th attacks are "criminals" then we will have a difficult time apprehending and
prosecuting them. If they are "enemies" engaged in war, then our pursuit of them will require that
we pay attention to the importance of preserving some idea of jus in bello.
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Terrorists are not merely pathological. They are political agents who utilize what I want to call a
calculus of terror. This is the negative caricature of a utilitarian or hedonic calculus. The calculus of
terror is designed to bring about certain ends. It is a rational decision procedure based upon the
insight that terror disrupts social structures. The terrorist is not interested in causing pain per se:
terror is not simply causing pain or killing. Rather, the terrorist is interested in using the threat of
pain in order to antagonize a people and destabilize a social structure. Terrorism is evil insofar as it
aims at destabilization and disruption. It is insidious in that it destabilizes and disrupts by creating
an atmosphere or mentality of fear. It is significant, for example, that the September 11th terrorists
succeeded in disrupting the lives of hundreds of millions of people in the Western world by the
"mere" hijacking of four airplanes resulting in the deaths of over 3,000 people. In strictly utilitarian
terms, terrorism is an economical means of political activity. In this sense, political agents who use
terrorism are not pathological at all, but are quite rational: they know how to do cost-benefit
analysis in order to maximize the results of their activity.
This discussion, of course, ignores the fact that religion is involved and that suicide bombers, such
as have continued to terrorize Israel, are committed to a calculus that transcends the calculus of
political advantage. This form of terrorism is caught up in an ideology that rewards the martyr’s
death in an afterlife and that valorizes the martyr in a culture of martyrdom. It is significant that
suicide bombers actively embrace their deaths and that, for example, their family members view
them as heroes. In this sense, however, we also see that terrorism (in its present Islamic
manifestation) is not simply a belief in terror for its own sake. Rather, it is fostered by a belief in
the value of struggle (jihad) and by what Rawls would call a "comprehensive doctrine" that is
antithetical to the values of the just war tradition and the values of peace and stability found in
Rawls’ formulation of the Law of Peoples. Such a view comes from a philosophy of history that
runs counter to the progressive ideal implicit in Rawls’ account.
Philosophy of History, Justice in War, and Terrorism
In the present section I will briefly discuss four rival theories about justice in war (there are more,
of course; these specific theories are utilized for purposes of example) in order to show the
connection between philosophy of history and political philosophy. I will also briefly suggest ways
that each of these perspectives would understand terrorism.
1. Realism. From a realist perspective, war is a necessary expedient for preserving power. From
this perspective, there are no limits in principle to the exercise of power. Rather, limits that we may
impose upon ourselves in the conduct of war are mere expedients designed to preserve power
during conflict and during the subsequent peace. This perspective follows from an analysis of
history that emphasizes the rise and fall of those in power. This is an analysis, which Machiavelli,
for example, undertook in both The Prince and the Discourses.11 The Machiavellian analysis of
history points to the fact that principles may be sacrificed in war. He concludes:
For where the very safety of the country depends upon the resolution to be taken, no
considerations of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor of glory or of shame,
should be allowed to prevail. But putting all other considerations aside, the only
question should be, What course will save the life and liberty of the country.12
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The point is that the goal of war is to preserve power and a way of life against those who are bent
on disrupting power and destroying this way of life. The goal of self-preservation supersedes all
other concerns. From this perspective, terrorism might be justified in the struggle against a political
power that is viewed as a threat to one’s way of life. In the same way that a no-limits war against
terrorism might be justified as an attempt by the other side to preserve power and its way of life.
History is replete with instances of terrorism utilized by individuals, factions, and indeed by states.
History (on this interpretation) further shows us that the use of force and violence is occasionally
necessary for those in power to preserve power and their way of life. As we shall see, this
willingness to ignore principle of justice out of a concern for self-preservation haunts Rawls’
discussion of the supreme emergency exemption.
2. Christianity. From the Christian perspective, war is part of the eschatological struggle between
good and evil. One undertakes war, from this perspective, out of love, which wants to protect others
from suffering.13 In war, the Christian is obligated to restrain himself according to moral principles
and war is undertaken with the goal of ending conflict and ensuring peace. As Augustine states:
"What, then, men want in war is that it should end in peace."14 War is an unfortunate necessity
given the fact that in this world, there is no peace. This perspective makes sense when understood
within the Christian philosophy of history, which distinguishes the city of man from the city of
God. From the Christian perspective, human history is a struggle between good and evil, with the
end of history itself understood in light of the final climactic battle of Armageddon. If the enemy is
evil, one is justified in fighting against him. Indeed, as Augustine concludes in The City of God, the
conclusion of history is the final judgment in which the evil will be punished and the good (those
who fight against evil) will obtain final eternal peace. Within this understanding of war and justice
in war, terrorism would presumably not be justified because it does not aim at peace. Although
Augustine recognizes that rebels and bandits disturb the peace in order to bring about a different
kind of peace, one of their own choosing, this contravention of peace is wickedness because it is
prideful.
Even when wicked men go to war they want peace for their own society and would like,
if possible, to make all men members of that society, so that everyone and everything
might be at the service of one head. Of course, the only means such a conqueror knows
is to have all men so fear or love him that they will accept the peace which he imposes.
For, so does pride perversely copy God. Sinful man hates the equality of all men under
God and, as though he were God, loves to impose his sovereignty on his fellow men. He
hates the peace of God which is just and prefers his own peace which is unjust.15
From this perspective, which implicitly condemns Machiavelli, it would be justified to fight a war
against those who disturb the peace by terrorism. However, this war must be conducted according
to principles of justice and restrained by the Christian goal of peace.
3. Kant. From Kant’s liberal perspective, war is to be avoided, although it is a necessary
component in the development of history. Kant says that "Nature has chosen war as a means" of
attaining its ends.16 These ends include driving human beings apart so that they might diversify and
expand and also pushing us together to form nations and states. This eventually leads to the
development of republicanism and the drive toward perpetual peace. Kant thus enumerates articles
of perpetual peace, which include the basic idea of restraint and justice in war. Notable is his 6th
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article, which states that acts of "hostility" such as the use of assassins and poisoners should be
prohibited because they undermine the mutual confidence necessary for future peace. "It must
remain possible, even in wartime, to have some sort of trust in the attitude of the enemy…"17 This
indicates that terrorism would be prohibited as well as what Kant calls a "war of extermination"
which could only conclude in "the vast graveyard of the human race."18 Kant’s philosophy of
history and his political philosophy thus point beyond war and condemn those activities such as
terrorism and genocide, which make a livable peace impossible.
4. Hegel. From Hegel’s perspective, war was a necessary movement of spirit as it evolved. War
was the result of conflicts within spirit as it struggled to actualize the idea that "all are free" in
history. However, now that the modern idea of freedom has triumphed, Hegel states that there are
certain limits to war, which are imposed by the idea of freedom. Now that states recognize each
other as justified representatives of their people, " war is something which ought to come to an
end."19 Hegel concludes that "War accordingly entails the determination of international law that it
should preserve the possibility of peace—so that, for example, ambassadors should be respected
and war should on no account be waged either on internal institutions and the peace of private and
family life, or on private individuals."20 Hegel would thus condemn terrorism because war is a
political mechanism for settling disputes between states. Hegel’s philosophy of history holds that
the idea of right has developed within interactions among and within institutional embodiments of
the idea. Terrorists (who are not representatives of legitimate institutional bodies) are thus outlaws.
States are represented by armies, which are the proper entities to conduct war. Moreover, war is to
be guided by principles derived from the modern idea of right including respect for the property and
life of non-combatants. Terrorism violates these ideas of right and departs from legitimate
institutional embodiments of spirit. It should be considered criminal activity and be subject to
punishment.
Rawls and the Philosophy of History
In the above examples, we have seen that just war theory is tied to questions about philosophy of
history. The concrete practical implications of a political theory are best understood within the
context of a philosophy of history. Rawls’ theory of international law and justice in war is no
exception. This poses a difficulty for Rawls because his ideal social contract is supposed to be a
model of the way in which reasonable beings would come to agreement about principles of justice,
despite disagreement about metaphysical ideas about progress in history. Likewise, his view of
justice in international relations attempts to avoid historical concerns by focusing on ideal
agreement among "peoples" who are abstracted from their previous historical interactions.
Nonetheless, Rawls wants to claim that his theory is tied to actuality insofar as it is "realistically"
utopian. Rawls’ discussion of the distinction between liberal and decent peoples, for example,
recognizes that concrete historical differences among peoples are inevitable and ineradicable.
However, Rawls maintains the hope (hence the utopian aspect of this theory) that liberal and decent
peoples can come to agree about the Law of Peoples. This hope derives from an implicit philosophy
of history in which diverse peoples will come to agreement about reasonable principles of justice.
This process (what Rawls calls the second original position) is, I argue, less ideal and more
historically situated than the analogous process that occurs in the first original position (the
domestic social contract). This is so because the parties in the second original position are engaged
in real political struggles that are guided by memories of past wars and fear of future war in a world
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that is fortified and armed. As we shall see, Rawls acknowledges the importance of concrete
historical facts both in his recognition of differences between liberal and decent peoples (as well as
outlaw states and burdened societies) and in his discussion of the supreme emergency exemption to
the principles of justice in war.
It would be easy to interpret Rawls’ idea of a Law of Peoples, if it were simply a restatement of the
more substantive liberalism of Kant, whose hope for moral progress is a postulate of practical
reason. However, one wonders what could justify Rawls in such a hope, especially in light of recent
events. Liberal optimism has been criticized, for example, by John Kekes who calls it "the liberal
faith" or "the enlightenment faith." Kekes links this explicitly to what he sees as a naively
optimistic philosophy of history and the inability of liberalism to deal with the problem of evil.21 In
The Law of Peoples, however, Rawls responds to this criticism by acknowledging atrocities such as
the Holocaust while defending what he calls "reasonable hope."22 Rawls discussion of hope has two
prongs. On the one hand, hope is needed in order to combat evil forces, "otherwise, the wrongful,
evil, and demonic conduct of others destroys us too and seals their victory."23 On the other hand,
hope is reasonable because the ideals of liberalism are already supported by liberal and decent
societies. From this we can derive the basic idea of Rawlsian philosophy of history. Hope for
progress toward international adoption of liberal values is supported by the idea that liberal values
have triumphed in the past. This hope then serves as a mechanism for further progress in
liberalization. Indeed Rawls bases this account on the historical fact that an international community
of liberal societies has tended toward peace and stability. He states "absence of war between major
established democracies is as close as anything to a simple empirical regularity in relations among
societies."24 He concludes that this historical generalization is the basic "hypothesis" that
"underwrites the Law of Peoples as a realistic utopia."25 Finally, he realizes that the hypothesis
itself will serve to stimulate progress.
Thus our answer to the question of whether a reasonably just Society of Peoples is
possible affects our attitudes toward the world as a whole. Our answer affects us before
we come to actual politics, and limits or inspires how we take part in it. Rejecting the
idea of a just and well-ordered Society of Peoples as impossible will affect the quality
and tone of those attitudes and will determine our politics in a significant way.26
Thus Rawls admits that the progressive interpretation of history is itself a power stimulant toward
further progress. We must believe that liberalization is possible in order to reasonably continue to
support it.
Kant (and Hegel) made similar claims about progress in history. However, these claims were
articulated within the context of a more broadly construed substantive liberalism that tied political
progress to moral progress and general enlightenment. From the perspective of political liberalism,
however, claims about progress are fallible generalizations, not metaphysical truths. All that Rawls’
philosophy of history can conclude is that "a Society of Peoples is indeed possible."27 He cannot
conclude, however, that it is inevitable or necessary. This theoretical limit has important
implications for the practical implementation of the Law of Peoples, as we shall see in the next
section.
The Supreme Emergency Exemption
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One sees the limits of Rawls’ philosophy of history in his discussion of the supreme emergency
exemption. The very idea of a supreme emergency is derived from a philosophical account of
history. A supreme emergency is one, which confronts a people with the impending fact of their
own annihilation. The example, which Rawls borrows from Walzer, is Great Britain in the early
1940’s. Certain historical facts are important for understanding this situation. At this time, Britain
was the only liberal European state unconquered by the Nazis; the United States had not yet entered
the war in support of Britain; and there was a credible Nazi threat to destroy the British government
and way of life. If these facts were accurate, then the British would have been justified, under the
supreme emergency exemption, in utilizing any means necessary to preserve their liberal society
(including the deliberate targeting of non-combatants, sabotage, and other acts of "terrorism").
This idea, as it is discussed by both Walzer and Rawls, draws upon Winston Churchill’s rhetorical
flourish in which he called Britain’s predicament in 1939 a "supreme emergency." The idea here is
that the danger posed by Nazism was so great that it justified violations of the standard principles of
jus in bello. As Walzer describes this, it is the "back-to-the-wall" argument: "when conventional
means of resistance are hopeless or worn out, anything goes (anything that is ‘necessary’ to win)."28
When a supreme emergency is recognized, we are thrown back upon the laws of necessity and, as
Walzer indicates, "necessity knows no rule."29 Walzer then indicates that one must make a concrete
judgment about the necessity of action, about the immanence of the threat, and about the immensity
of the danger. This judgment is, however, undertaken in the dark and Walzer calls it a "wager." We
wager that the determinate crime of killing innocents can be justified in light of the immeasurable
evil that would result if we did not act (an evil such as the triumph of Nazism).30 Walzer’s
discussion of the supreme emergency indicates a point at which utilitarian reasoning mixed with a
dose of political realism overrides other principles of justice.
Rawls’ discussion of the supreme emergency exemption picks up on Walzer’s idea in both
substance and detail (including critiques of the allied bombing of Germany and Japan). Thus Rawls
seems to indicate that he is, at the limit, a realist about history who is willing—in certain extreme
emergencies—to sacrifice principles for pragmatics. Indeed, Rawls tackles the question of realism
directly in The Law of Peoples, where he attempts to distinguish his point of view from a strain of
realism, which stretches back to Thucydides. Rawls’ argument with the realist who interprets
history as ceaseless struggle and war (and who then justifies expedience in war at the expense of
principle) amounts to a different interpretation of the facts of history. As we have seen, Rawls
claims that progress toward peace is possible because liberal peoples do not willingly go to war
with one another. The realist interpretation of history, in opposition to this, is not so sanguine about
the prospects for perpetual peace.
The point here is that an interpretation of the historical facts—coming from a more general
philosophy of history—is required in order to make the determination that a current crisis is a
supreme emergency. How can we ever be sure that a current crisis is a supreme emergency? Could
the British know for sure that a Nazi invasion was immanent or would be successful? Can we be
sure that the terrorism of September 11th is part of a global pattern of violent anti-American activity
that will stop at nothing to destroy us? Such questions point toward concrete empirical analysis but
also toward philosophy of history. A realist would note that aggressive states continue to expand
unless resisted and would view aggression as typical, while a Rawlsian would emphasize progress
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toward a Society of Peoples and would view aggression as an exceptional and increasingly rare
occurrence.
It is not surprising that a realist would allow for practical exemptions to the principles of justice in
war. Indeed, the very idea of a supreme emergency points toward a realist interpretation of history,
one that is willing to sacrifice principles to preserve the power that enforces those principles. If
political liberalism is supposed to be principled and not merely pragmatic, however, it might be
surprising that it is open to the idea of a supreme emergency exemption.31 However, we must
remember that Rawls describes his position as both "realistic" and "utopian." The realistic aspect of
this utopia is precisely what opens the door to the supreme emergency exemption. From Rawls’
point of view, the historical goal is the triumph of the Law of Peoples. For liberal peoples, the
"long-run aim is to bring all societies eventually to honor the Law of Peoples and to become full
members in good standing of the society of well-ordered peoples."32 A supreme emergency
undermines the possibility of the creation of a Society of Peoples. In this rare case, liberal ideals
must be defended by any means possible.
This, however, seems to push Rawls in a direction that could undermine an overlapping consensus
about the principles of justice in war. A Kantian liberal, for example, would agree to the terms of
the Law of Peoples but would reject the idea of a supreme emergency exemption because the
Kantian philosophy of history remains hopeful and the Kantian moral philosophy prohibits the
deliberate violation of principles of justice. Likewise, a Buddhist would agree to the Law of Peoples
but would reject the idea of a supreme emergency exemption because, in the words of the Dalai
Lama, "violence begets violence. And violence means one thing only: suffering."33 In both of these
cases, a larger metaphysical view prohibits the deliberate violation of the principles of justice.
Indeed Rawls recognizes this in his discussion of the Christian just war theory. He acknowledges
that the Christian theory would reject the supreme emergency exemption.34 The idea of the supreme
emergency exemption, then, is controversial in a way that most of the rest of Rawls’ just war theory
is not. It is thus not clear why Rawls includes the supreme emergency exemption in his discussion.
One explanation of this is that Rawls is afraid that his ideas would be too utopian without this
realist exemption.35 Another explanation is that Rawls is not fully committed to the hopeful view of
history that he defends throughout the book. In either case, Rawls’ just war theory is linked to a
certain philosophy of history, which requires this realist exemption. This is troubling to the extent
that it might undermine the possibility of overlapping consensus about the Law of Peoples among
those who have alternative historical points of view.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I wonder whether the present "war on terrorism" constitutes a supreme emergency,
which would allow us to directly attack Afghani or other civilians. The rhetoric uttered by President
Bush and others following the September 11th attacks did tend to sound the alarm of an all-out
assault against our way of life. Almost immediately after the destruction of September 11th, our
politicians and their media interpreters began speaking of America’s "new war." These events were
compared with the events at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. We began preparing for war and
soon we were dropping bombs on foreign soil, resulting in what one hopes is the "inadvertent"
killing of innocent civilian life. Such inadvertent killing could be justified by a realist theory, by the
Christian just war theory or by Rawls’ just war theory. The realist, of course, allows killing in
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pursuit of power. The traditional Christian point of view grudgingly accepts civilian casualties if
they are indeed inadvertent (and thus the result of "double effect"). From Rawls’ point of view such
killings could be justified if they constituted a legitimate response to a supreme emergency. Rawls
does not directly state whether the supreme emergency exemption would apply to terrorists,
although we can presume that states that harbor terrorists could be categorized as outlaws. If the
threat to our liberal way of life were severe enough, the supreme emergency exemption would
justify deliberately targeting civilians. Kantian just war theory would not, however, allow such
killing of civilians because it would violate the proscription against using persons as means toward
further ends. It is important to note—in opposition to the rhetoric of our politicians and our pundits
—that only in the case of a crass form of utilitarian realism would the killing of civilians be
justified by looking at a balance sheet that shows that since "they" killed over 3,000, we are entitled
to kill a few thousand of "them."
A Kantian would thus condemn the "war on terrorism" for its risks to non-combatants. I want to
suggest further that in fact none of the civilian casualties caused in Afghanistan can be justified as a
"war on terrorism," according to either the Christian or the Rawlsian points of view. This is because
the "war on terrorism" is a metaphorical war and is not a real war. This "war" is not a conflict with
another state. It is not even a conflict between "peoples," as Rawls defines this.36 The terrorist
networks that we are currently pursuing consist of small sets of private individuals without a
geographical base and without the other trapping of political sovereignty. Thus the current "war on
terrorism" is a metaphorical war. It is a "war" in the same sense that we have been engaged in a
"war on drugs." This means that "war" in the present sense has been extended beyond its customary
usage in traditional just war theory. The "war on terrorism," because it is not a war between
peoples or states, should be understood as a law-enforcement concern and should be conducted
within the limits established for law-enforcement including restraint of force, due process, and
certain conventions about the burden of proof. This means that the bombing campaign against
Afghanistan could not be justified solely on the basis of pursuing Osama bin Laden and his
network.37
The rhetoric of war must be carefully guarded in order to avoid what Jonathan Glover has called
"military drift."38 We should always be careful about using the indiscriminate destructive force of
modern warfare. And we must be judicious about using the rhetoric of war, lest we become too
willing to sacrifice principles of justice for success in killing. The rhetoric of war tends to incline us
toward a realist point of view where supreme emergencies loom. I do not deny that the events of
September 11th were horrible. I do doubt, however, that they constitute a supreme emergency. One
must note again that such judgments are always made within the context of a philosophy of history.
An outright realist might indeed see September 11th as an act of war. For a Rawlsian, however the
burden of proof that would invoke the supreme emergency exemption seems to be much higher: a
realist exemption that would justify an all out war on terrorism could not yet be invoked. Indeed, if
liberal states must resort to violence in response to terrorism, they must be careful not to sacrifice
their liberal principles in the name of realism. Political liberalism’s highest aspiration is for a
reasonable pluralism in which those who adhere to divergent comprehensive doctrines can agree to
certain basic principles of justice, which ensure stability and peace. An overzealous invocation of
the realist supreme emergency exemption tends to devalue liberalism by making it appear as one
comprehensive doctrine among many competing for power on the global stage. Liberal states such
as the United States are often guilty of violating liberal principles in order to attain political ends in
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the international arena. Such political maneuvers can further antagonize those terrorists who are
opposed to liberal values and who fight against liberalism using terror tactics, which are useful from
the perspective of political realism. A liberal response to terrorism (whether Rawlsian or Kantian)
would demonstrate its commitment to liberal values by holding on to its utopian hopes for the
triumph of progressive values, while resisting the urge to slip toward realism and a war on terrorism
which itself becomes terrorist.
Andrew Fiala
University of Wisconsin—Green Bay
Notes
1. Although recent events tend to focus our interest on the September 11th attacks on the
United States, we can include among terrorists not only Osama bin Laden but also
Palestinian suicide bombers, the Irish Republican Army, Ted Kaczynski (the Unabomber),
Timothy McVeigh, and others who utilize certain tactics designed to subvert domestic or
international order by way of terror. What unites this diverse group is their tactics. As a
recent RAND report defines terrorism: “Terrorist tactics, in most cases, violated the rules that
governed armed conflict—for example, the deliberate targeting of noncombatants or actions
against hostages” [Ian O. Lesser, et al., Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 1999), v].
2. This seems to be the case with bin Laden but also, oddly enough, links him with Kaczynski
and McVeigh.
3. Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 108.
4. Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Kant: Political Writings, 109.
5. This paper thus connects to other critiques of Rawls, which indicate that his form of
liberalism is not as non-metaphysical as it claims to be. For example, Michael Sandel,
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
6. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 128.
7. Countering the New Terrorism, v.
8. Countering the New Terrorism, v.
9. What follows is based upon Countering the New Terrorism, xii.
10. For example, Chapter 16 of The Prince or Chapters 40 and 41 of the Discourses [both in
Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses (New York: The Modern Library, 1950)].
11. Machiavelli, Discourses, 528.
12. “For love’s sake (the very principle of the prohibition of killing), and not only for the sake
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of an abstract justice sovereign over the political realm in separation from the private,
Christian thought and action was driven to posit this single ‘exception’ (an exception only
when externally viewed): that forces should be repelled and the bearers and close cooperators
in military force should be directly repressed, by violent means if necessary, lest many more
of God’s little ones should be irresponsibility forsaken and lest they suffer more harm than
need be” [Paul Ramsey, The Just War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968), 150-151]
13. Augustine, City of God, 452.
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15. Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant: Political Writings, 111.
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17. Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant: Political Writings, 96.
18. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), § 338.
19. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 338.
20. “The name for this pipe-dream is the Enlightenment Faith. It is the illusion of an epoch
that stretches from Rousseau to contemporary liberalism. It is the secular equivalent of the
religious faith of Christianity, which it is intended to replace. It is fueled by a groundless
optimism that substitutes wishes for facts, refuses to face reality, ignores history, and radiates
a moralistic fervor…” [John Kekes, A Case for Conservatism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1998), 211]. Kekes links his own “pessimistic conservatism” explicitly to the
political realism of thinkers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes (A Case for
Conservatism, 90). For further discussion of the liberal faith, cf. Kekes, Against Liberalism
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), Chapter 7.
21. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 23.
22. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 22.
23. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 52.
24. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 54.
25. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 128.
26. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 124.
27. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 252.
28. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 254.
29. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 259-60.
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30. I discuss the connections between Rawls, Walzer, and American Pragmatism in
“Toleration and Pragmatism” in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16:2 (forthcoming).
31. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 93.
32. The Dalai Lama, Ethics for The New Millennium (New York: Riverhead Books, 1999),
201.
33. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 103-105.
34. This is suggested by Rawls’ discussion of utopianism in The Law of Peoples, pp. 6-7.
35. Rawls’ idea of a “people” focuses primarily on “liberal peoples” who have common
sympathies, a moral nature, and a representative government (Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 23-
24). Terrorist networks may have common sympathies. But their illiberal tactics serve to
undermine that claim that they have a moral nature. And they are not represented by any
government.
36. It might be justified on some other basis such as the fact that the Taliban regime was
illegitimate and dangerous to the people of Afghanistan or to international stability. In this
sense, the Taliban regime was an “outlaw state” in Rawls’ sense. This would be especially
true, insofar as the regime could be distinguished from the people it governed. Rawls’
discussion of justice in war indicates that the prosecution of a war against such an outlaw
state must be careful to distinguish between the regime and its people (Rawls, The Law of
Peoples, 94-96). This consideration would then prohibit the indiscriminate bombing of
civilian targets as a means for removing the regime.
37. Jonathan Glover, Humanity (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 75.
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